Cross-Strait Relations through Lens of China's Two Sessions
China Times Editorial, March 9, 2026
Mainland China’s Two Sessions government work report and the “15th Five-Year Plan draft” have been released. As widely expected, the long-term tone and existing policies regarding Taiwan remain unchanged. As the global situation grows turbulent and the international order erodes, the Taiwan Strait has become a high-risk geopolitical region. All sides are striving to maintain a “stalemated peace” and avoid crossing red lines. The mainland’s steady Taiwan policy may not be the best outcome, but it is not a bad one either.
Mainland China’s policy thinking toward Taiwan in the “15th Five-Year Plan” had already been revealed in last year’s resolution of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: institutionalizing the “two-handed hard–soft strategy” into a “dual-track hard–soft system.” The first track is “anti-independence.” In the 15th Five-Year Plan, opposition to Taiwan independence has been upgraded to cracking down on Taiwan independence, shifting from a stance to action. The 22-point “Guidelines on Imposing Criminal Punishments on Diehard ‘Taiwan independence’ Separatists for Conducting or Inciting Secession” will become a policy tool towards Taiwan. The other track is “integration,” meaning exchanges, cooperation, and integrated development. Narratives on cross-strait economic and trade ties, cultural exchanges, youth exchanges, and demonstration zones for cross-strait integrated development will continue. It also reiterates the goal of “building a common cross-strait market,” implying that the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) will remain unchanged and that stability across the Strait will be maintained through civil exchanges.
The 15th Five-Year Plan introduces new expressions such as “safeguarding the common home of the Chinese nation” and “jointly creating the enduring well-being of the Chinese nation.” The former originates from signals released by Chinese President Xi Jinping in April 2024, before the President Lai Ching-te took office, interpreting the 1992 Consensus through the concept of the Chinese nation. The latter also comes from Mr. Xi’s New Year address. “Enduring well-being” implies that the mainland will not rush for quick results and does not wish to interrupt or severely undermine the process of national rejuvenation through war.
Observing mainland China’s recent concrete actions in Taiwan policy, the dual-track approach is indeed being implemented. On the one hand, the Taiwan Affairs Office targeted Minister of the Interior Liu Shih-fang’s nephew for doing business in the mainland as a warning shot, publicly signaling concrete action to “crack down on Taiwan independence.” On the other hand, when President Lai—rarely and for the first time since taking office—referred to the other side as the “mainland” rather than “China,” and called for peaceful cross-strait development, the Taiwan Affairs Office responded that “people on both sides of the Strait are Chinese, one family,” without issuing a rebuttal.
A more sensitive indicator is that one week after President Lai used “the mainland” to refer to the other side, mainland military aircraft stopped flying around the median line of the Taiwan Strait. Some interpret this as an aftereffect of military rectification; others believe it was intended to create a calmer atmosphere for a possible summit between President Donald Trump of the United States and Mr. Xi. But it can also be interpreted as a positive response to President Lai’s adjustment through military de-escalation, which is conducive to maintaining a path of peaceful cross-strait development.
From parallel dual tracks to moving toward each other, mutual trust between the governing authorities on both sides of the Strait remains severely insufficient. Yet there may be a similar willingness—at least on the civilian, softer, and peaceful track—to find some degree of intersection. Recently, as the Middle East situation suddenly intensified, when mainland Chinese embassies in the region began evacuating citizens, holders of Taiwan Compatriot Permits were included. In response, Premier Cho Jung-tai stated that citizens should prioritize seeking protection from Taiwan’s overseas missions, but that “when countries or other organizations act with humanitarian spirit, they will not make unnecessary political considerations.” The Premier’s remarks effectively respected the freedom of overseas Taiwanese to make their own choices and did not criticize the other side.
President Lai recently said that when facing common enemies such as natural disasters, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can cooperate. Under the shadow of sudden war, if overseas Taiwanese citizens can receive proper care and protection from mainland Chinese diplomatic missions, would this not be an example of cross-strait cooperation in addressing a humanitarian crisis?
From Ukraine, Palestine, and Venezuela to Iran, in recent years the fierce competition among major powers has already produced too many scenes of devastation, broken families, and social upheaval. One can therefore appreciate the value of the Taiwan Strait still maintaining peace, stability, and ongoing exchanges. It cannot be denied that in the foreseeable future the established policies of the authorities on both sides will not change. The best scenario for the Taiwan Strait is a “stalemated peace.” Yet breaking the deadlock is not impossible; it requires opening up knots of mistrust from the inside out and through combined internal and external efforts.
The Russia–Ukraine war continues to drag on, and fighting in the Middle East has reignited, leaving the world in an extremely uncertain state. Preserving stability and maintaining balance is beneficial for China and East Asia alike. At this moment, President Lai has taken the first step toward easing cross-strait relations, and mainland China has responded with pragmatism, calmness, and positivity. This marks a good beginning for cross-strait relations at the start of the 15th Five-Year Plan.
From: https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20260309000663-260301?chdtv